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In the early 1970s North Carolina electric utility com-
panies planned to embark on construction projects for
new plants costing billions of dollars. But, for the first
time in the history of the state, power firm policies fell
upon turbulent waters. Soaring electric rates had
resulted in a tide of consumer outrage. Legislative ef-
forts delayed the companies from sailing their
original courses. Questions were being raised about
utility pricing policies.
In 1975, the North Carolina legislature adopted a
measure by Senator McNeill Smith to require the
state Utilities Commission to hold public hearings on
peak load pricing and the future needs for electricity
in the state. After the December, 1 975 hearings, the
Commission ordered the utilities to submit plans to
implement this form of pricing.
With peak load pricing, a consumer is charged a
rate based upon the time of day he uses the electrici-
ty. This system charges a lower rate for off-peak use
to encourage electricity consumption at off-peak
"With peak load pricing, a con-
sumer is charged a rate based upon
the time of day he uses electricity."
periods. Advocates of peak load pricing, sometimes
called time of day or marginal cost pricing, claim there
could be an immediate reduction in average monthly
bills and that construction programs for new
generating capacity to meet peak demand would be
delayed for a significant period in the future.
The present rate structure is left over from the past
when average costs for generating electricity were
declining. Back then, people never used to worry
whether they turned off lights in empty rooms or tried
to conserve electricity in other ways. Most people did
not question or understand the reason for the rate
structure, because as their use increased, they got a
cheaper rate, something like a bulk rate. They felt it
was not worth the effort to conserve energy because
it did not lower their monthly bill very much.
People were behaving exactly as the economic text
books predicted. The declining block rate structure
lowered the unit cost as more electricity was con-
sumed. This meant that the last unit cost less than the
average price. Even though electric bills rose with in-
creased consumption, the added cost of using one
more unit was small. 1
Why the Increase in Electrical Rates?
In 1973, the oil embargo by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the en-
suing "energy crisis" raised our consciousness about
a phenomenon that had begun several years earlier.
Energy prices were rising. In North Carolina in 1 961
the average price for one kilowatt* hour of electricity
was 0.01 25 dollars. In 1 967,that price had dropped to
0.011 dollars. But by 1975, the average price had
climbed to 0.0265 dollars and is still climbing. 2 There
were several reasons for this change.
In the 1950's and 1960's the electric companies
took advantage of economies of scale as they built
larger and larger generating plants. The price of
various fuels was nearly constant and these two fac-
tors combined to cause a decreasing cost of electricity
generation. The only rate cases heard by the Utilities
Commission were requests by the utility companies
for decreases in rates. Meanwhile, the public enjoyed
a substantial increase in real income, making it that
much more difficult to get excited about the technical
aspects of efficiency in electricity generation.
Electric power generating plants continued to ex-
pand. But, sometime in the early 1 970's the electric
utilities industry ran out of economiesof scaleandthe
costs of electricity and of additional generating plants
began a rapid rise. This phenomenon, coupled with
the sudden increase in oil and coal prices has spurred
the abrupt jump in electrical rates.
Is the Existing Rate Structure
Part of the Problem?
The present rate structures were drawn up in the
old days. Since large generating plants were more ef-
ficient and had smaller average costs than the small
*A kilowatt is an amount of electricity used at any
moment. An electric toaster might have a demand of
1,000 watts or one kilowatt. The same toaster if
operated for an hour would consume one
kilowatthour fkwh) of electricity.
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Duke Power's Belews Creek Plant
Photo courtesy Duke Power Co.
plants, it seemed clear that if people could be induced
to use more electricity, more efficient plants could be
built and everyone would benefit from lower average
electric rates. Therefore, the declining block system
became the traditional way of pricing. The power
company calculated the total expected cost of produc-
ing the electricity which included a "fair" rate of
return on its capital, and divided by the number of
kilowatt hours it expected to generate. This way it
arrived at a price per kilowatt hour. This average price
was then modified to charge a higher rate for the
small user and a lower rate for the large consumers.
Consumers were rewarded with lower rates if they
used devices that consumed large quantities of elec-
tricity, like hot water heaters and electric heating for
houses.
The result today, however, is not a lower average
cost for generating electricity, but a higher cost,
revealing the relation between cost and output. This
cost of new expensive generating capacity, en-
couraged under the present system, is spread to all
consumers in the form of higher average electric bills.
It is one source of inefficiency in electricity genera-
tion.
A second inefficiency results from having prices
and costs not directly related to each other. Under ex-
isting conditions, the cost of generating electricity in-
creases with the amount being generated, because
the most efficient generating plants are brought in
first. In 1 974, the fuel cost alone varied from 0.001 86
dollars to 0.02768 dollars per kilowatt hour in the
Duke system. 3 Average costs in the system are in-
creasing with total use. Therefore, the cost of
generating electricity at periods of peak demand is
greater than the cost of generating it at times of low
use. But people pay the same amount regardless of
when they use it. Since this rate is charged at all
times, the consumer has no incentive to plan to select
the time of his use. The result is a greater demand at
peak times, which requires the power companies to
maintain additional expensive generating plants. The
consumer is caught in a precarious position within an
inefficient pricing system—a pricing system that en-
courages greater total use and greater peak use.
What are the alternatives? What would be the effects
of using a different approach? A good starting place to
look for these answers is to examine the way other
goods are distributed and priced.
The Competitive Model
In a competitive economic system, the consumers
ultimately decide how a nation will allocate its scarce
and limited resources by casting dollar votes in the
market place. Consumers decide, for example, if the
nation is to have an abundant supply of automobiles,
rather than a well developed mass transit system.*
In all cases, the individual consumer decides
whether or not to buy something by comparing the ex-
pected benefit with the price. In any competitive
market, the prices of manufactured commodities
reflect the marginal cost of producing the com-
modities.
The electric utilities industry is not a part of the
competitive system. In the past, the first company to
supply electricity to an area became the monopoly
supplier. To protect citizens from monopoly power,
states established commissions to regulate these in-
dustries.
On the one hand, the commission has a chance to
set electricity prices in any way it chooses. On the
other hand, the commission hasthe verydifficulttask
of performing the functions that occur automatically
through the interaction of producers and consumers
in the competitive sector. The commission faces the
problem of making the interrelated decision of how
much electric capacity to have, and how to set the
price signals that consumers use to decide how much
electricity they want and when they want it.
There is an important distinction between a com-
petitive market and a monopoly or non-competitive
*John Kenneth Galbraith would argue that in the
real world of giant monopolies, corporations are able
to cajole, coerce, and deceive the consumer into buy-
ing what the corporations want to sell. Barry Com-
moner in the Poverty ofPower argues that the demise
of public transit in the U.S. was helped along by
General Motors buying up municipal trolley systems
and shutting them down.
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system. The price is always a signal to the consumer
for deciding how much of each item to purchase in
both systems, but only in a perfectly competitive
system must the price represent the marginal cost to
the society of producing each item.
Marginal Cost Pricing
In a competitive market a producer does not set the
price. The market determines the going price and the
producer decides how much of this item to produce by
comparing the price with his marginal cost.
The marginal cost is the cost of producing an extra
unit or the difference in his total costs now and his
total costs when he produces one more unit. If the
marginal cost to produce a pencil, for example, is only
two cents, but the market price is three cents, the
manufacturer will continue to produce pencils and
expand his output. When the marginal cost to
produce the pencil equals the market price of three
cents he will not produce beyond this quantity
because the addition to cost would be greater than
the increase in revenue which is market price. He will
not, for example, want to expand production to a point
where the marginal cost of that pencil is three and a
half cents, half a cent above the market price. In a
competitive system, all production will be such that
the price of each good is equal to its marginal cost.
In the above case of pencils, this is a readily applied
concept. In the case of electricity production and
throughout this paper, however, the large scale and
expense of generating plants make it appropriate to
consider Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC). The
marginal cost is always the cost of producing another
unit; however, when producing another unit involves
building a new multi-billion dollar plant, this new
capacity cost must be considered in calculating the
marginal cost at levels of output which press against
capacity. Since the cost of each new plant is greater
than the last one, and it does not matter why the costs
are increasing (it might be due to construction or
capacity or pollution controls etc.), the appropriate
long run marginal cost must reflect the cost of in-
creasing the output. This is necessary if the optimal
amount of generating capacity in the system is to be
determined. In the long run, the desired amount of
new capacity can be determined only by seeing how
much electricity people want to use at a price that in-
cludes the potential cost of new capacity.
Because marginal cost pricing means setting the
price equal to the cost of producing one more unit, it is
irrelevant that some of the peaking electricity comes
from hydro plants which have low marginal costs un-
til they are fully used. The appropriate price is the cost
of another KWH to the system. The general theory
tells us that incremental capital costs should be in-
cluded in the prices attached to the time period in
which use presses against capacity. This is fair since
it allocates the new construction costs to those who
demand electricity during peak periods, and who,
therefore, are making the new construction
necessary. 4 On the other hand, including the cost of
new construction might well decrease demand, and
make construction of new generating plants un-
necessary. "Both the British and the French electrici-
ty industries have reported improvements in system
load factors of between 10 and 20 percent." 5 At the
present time in the Duke system, which recorded 44
per cent reserves during its greatest peak, this would
not have a matter of practical importance in rate set-
ting. However, if and when the system demand does
increase enough to approach capacity, then the
marginal cost prices will reflect this marginal con-
struction cost, and should result in equitable and ef-
ficient distribution of the costs.
The Present System is in Conflict with
the Competitive Model
Regulatory commissions now set a price for elec-
tricity that has no relationship to the marginal cost of
generating it. The price of electricity, though, still
remains the signal on which the consumer bases the
decision topurchaseor notto purchase. Butthatprice
has no direct relationship to the cost to society of
producing it. The present pricing system leads to less
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Duke Power Company System Load for Day of Greatest
Summer Peak, Monday, August 25, 1975
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use of cheap off-peak electricity and more use of the
expensive peak electricity. Therefore the average cost
of all electricity generation is increased.
If the consumer were charged for the average costs
of the products he used, the market place would be
chaotic, like the supermarket described by Columbia
University economist William Vickery, at the peak
load pricing hearings before the North Carolina
Utilities Commission during December, 1975.
To eliminate the bother of checkout counters, the
supermarket would do away with the present
marginal cost pricing system and institute an average
price for all the goods based only on the weight of the
purchase. For example, an economist might find the
average price per pound by weighing all expected
purchases at the grocery stores and dividing the en-
tire weight into the desired revenue.
This pricing system would facilitate matters at the
checkout station and probably eliminate lines. A sim-
ple scale would weigh each consumer's purchase
and the bill would be based upon a fixed price per
pound.
The result of this pricing scheme is predictable, said
Vickery. The consumer would buy considerably more
steak and less potatoes, and the supermarket would
go broke. If this were a monopoly situation with no
competing stores, then it could stay in business by
substantially raising the average price.
Illustrative Examples
Figure 1 , the August 25, 1 975,daily pattern for the
Duke system, illustrates the variation of demand over
a 24-hour period for the day of the highest summer
peak demand. The lowest demand was 4,503
megawatts at 5 a.m. The average demand for the day
was 6,834 megawatts and was reached between 9
and 10 a.m. The greatest peak demand was over
8,400 megawatts and occured between 5 p.m. and 6
p.m.*
In Figure 2, MCshowsthe relationship between the
marginal cost of generating the electricity and the
amount being generated. This curve starts at a low
level, corresponding to the use of the least expensive
base load generating plants, then increases as the in-
termediate plants are brought in, and finally in-
creases sharply as the "peaking" plants are added. As
the limits of capacity are reached, this curve includes
the cost of building new generating capacity to satisfy
a further increase in demand and rises even more
steeply. Graph (1) represents the demand shown in
*At this same time Duke Power had over 12,400
megawatts of installed generating capacity. About 40
per cent of capacity was idle at the time of greatest
use. This level of reserves is more than double the
amount considered desirable in the industry. In
general, utilities like to have between 15 and 20 per
cent reserves. This amount should be computed con-
sidering the possible purchases from neighboring
systems. It shouldbe added that the reserve is needed
only as long as prices are not flexible so that there is
no way to discourage use during a temporary shut-
down of a plant.
Figure 2
Different Pricing Systems and the Effects on Electricity-
Use
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Table 1
Generating Capacity and Total Sales of Class A
Electric Utility Companies in North Carolina
1970-1975
Generating Capacity' 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 Average
(KWH in 1000s Yearly
Change
Duke 56,932,821 60,059,756 66,510,270 76,927,801 99,631,733 111,303,877 14.34
Vepco 46,147,680 48,013,560 55,179,240 67,162,920 74,889,240 81,035,130 11.92
CP&L 29,522,560 40,121,404 44,317,276 50,609,096 55,750,240 64,388,087 1688
Nantahala 876.000 898.898 950,327 988,52/1 1,017,033 957,265 1.79
Total 133,479,061 149,093,618 166,957,113 195,688,338 231,288,246 257,684,359 14.06
Sales (incl jdmg Resale) 2
(KWH in 1000 s)
Duke 35,287,995 36,912,737 39,688,068 43,158,623 42,343,600 42,137,670 3.61
Vepco 23,505,825 24,686,096 26,910,710 30,044,018 29,872,991 31,488.319 6.02
CP&L 17,547,500 19,656,673 22,101,472 24,081,319 24,076,446 24,118,233 6.57
Nantahala 374,735 415,173 414,278 445,685 474,269 412,891 1 96
Total 76,716,055 81,670,679 89,114,528 97,729,645 96,767,306 98,157,113 5.05
Ratio
(Sales/Generating Capacity)
Duke
Vepco
CP&L
Nantahala
Total
Average Price 3
(C/KWH)
6198
.5094
.5944
.4278
.5747
1.34
.6146
.5141
4899
4619
.5478
143
.5967
4877
4987
4359
.5338
1.49
.5610
4473
.4758
4509
.4994
1.60
.4250
.3989
.4319
.4663
.4187
2.04
.3786
.3886
.3746
.4313
.3809
2.65
'Total installed KW capacity (FPC Form No. 1 p. 432-434) x8760hours/year + KWH purchased (FPC Form No. 1 pg.431,L 10)
2FPC Form No. 1, p. 409. L. 12
3FPC Form No. 1, p. 409, L. 10, col. (b)/col(d): does not include resale
Figure 1 between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m., Graph (2), the de-
mand between 10 a.m. and 1 1 a.m., and Graph (3),
the demand between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m.
Under the present system, a customer is charged
the same price per KWH whenever the electricity is
used. The present average price is represented as Pn
and was about 2.65 cents per KWH in 1975. At this
price, consumers used q n 1 between 4 a.m. and 5 a.m.
as shown in graph (1 ). Later in the day, they used q n 2
as shown in graph (2), and during the peak time with
the price still at Pn consumers used q n 3 as shown in
Graph (3).
These same graphs also illustrate the effects of
changing to a marginal cost, flat-rate (no block rates
with variable time of day pricing) pricing system. A
marginal cost pricing system would set prices equal
to the marginal costs. Setting marginal cost prices
consists of determining where the demand curve in-
tersects the MC (marginal cost) curve in each
diagram. An optimal set of prices is shown by P, in
Graph (1 ), P 2 in Graph (2), and P 3 in Graph (3). Com-
paring the different prices, it is seen that the marginal
cost price would be lower than the existing price at
the times represented by Graph (1 ) , and since the
price was lower, people would use more electricity at
this time, an increase from q n ' toQ 1 . Much of this in-
crease would come from people installing automatic
timed switches on water heaters as is done in coun-
tries where time of day pricing is used. 6
The price and quantity during the period
represented by Graph (2) would be quite similar to the
present for most residential users. The second big
difference would occur during period (3). During this
peak time, the electricity would be priced at its
marginal cost instead of being subsidized. The price
would be set at P
3 . Because of the higher price, peo-
ple would want to use less at this time and quantity
would fall from q n 3 to Q 3 .
It is obvious that a substantial saving would be in-
curred. The people who now use q n3 of electricity at
the time of peak do so because they are charged only
Pn. However, the real cost of this electricity is p*. The
difference between these prices can be classified as a
subsidy, financed by charging everyone more for their
electricity at other times. The difference in these
costs at different times of day increases as the system
peak is reached,and has been estimated to vary by as
much as from a low of about one cent per kwh at late
winter 1977, vol. 3 no. 1 20
night to over 1 1 cents per kwh at peak.*
Table 1 shows the relation between electric price
and output and generating capacity. It was prepared
by the office of Senator McNeill Smith whose bill es-
tablished the hearings on electricity pricing.
The table shows that in the face of decreasing de-
mand, utility companies have continued to expand
generating capacity. Prof its from electric utility com-
panies are established as rates of return on capital
base. This means that the more capital there is, the
more profit there will be. But profit comes from higher
electric rates. 7
In 1970 Duke Power's ratio of output to capacity
was 61 .98%; by 1 975 this had fallen to only 37.86%.
This means that generating capacity has been in-
creasing much faster than sales. As the percentage of
excess capacity increases, the rate per kilowatthour
increases.
Benefits
Possibly the largest savings from marginal cost
pricing would be gained in the long run because the
higher price and lower use at peak times could
decrease the need for new construction. If sometime
in the future, some customers showed by their
willingness to pay a high price at peak, that using
electricity at the time of peak was worth to them as
much as it cost to produce the electricity, then peak-
ing plants could be added. But, they would be paid for
only by the people using the electricity at the time of
peak, rather than by all customers.
When marginal capital costs are included in the
peak period marginal cost, the discrepancy between
peak and off-peak costs becomes greater as the cost
of generating plants increases. For example, Duke
Power estimates the cost of its proposed Perkins
nuclear plant at more than 632 dollars per kilowatt of
generating capacity. 8 If a pricing system could
eliminate or reduce the need for excess capacity then
expensive construction programs could be eliminated
at a great savings to the consumer.
A peak load pricing system should also provide
benefits to lower income utility users. If a marginal
cost pricing system was implemented in North
Carolina, the total revenue collected by the utilities
would be likely to exceed the total costs for produc-
tion. To keep consumers bills equal to average
generating costs, a rebate of the difference be-
tween the total revenue collected and the total cost
should be offered to the customer. The rebate would
be computed by determining the difference between
the total revenue collected and the total costs of
operating the system, and dividing this by the number
*Differences this large probably only occur when a
system is being used almost to capacity and the
marginal capital cost of new construction are
therefore included in the marginal cost calculation. A t
the present rate of utilization in the electric systems
in North Carolina, the price difference wouldbe much
less because there is much unused capacity even at
the times of peak usage.
of customers served. Since electricity use increases
directly with income (Recent federal studies show an
income elasticity of electricity use of about 1 by cross
section. 9 Most studies show in time series analysis
the income elasticity is about .5 10 .),this would cause a
relative decrease in the electric bills of low income
people. Therefore, a peak load pricing scheme should
have positive distributional effects.
WhyThree Instead ofTwo Prices?
With a peak-load pricing system, at least three
prices are needed over a 24-hour period, plus one or
two emergency prices. The time of highest price
would be a three to four hour period during the
heaviest demand. A second period would include
most of the remaining waking hours and would be
similar to the existing price. A third rate, for late night
hours, would be much lower prices to reward off-
peak users.
"Possibly the largest savings from
marginal cost pricing would be gained
in the long run because the higher
price and lower use at peak times
could decrease the need for new con-
struction."
During the hours of greatest demand and highest
price, a consumer might choose to wait a few hours
before turning up the air-conditioner or save even
more electricity by turning off his hot water heater. At
off-peak hours when the price is very low, the
customer might take advantage of the low rates by us-
ing a timer on his water heater, freezer, etc. Because
time of summer peak coincides with the time when
solar energy is most available, a peak pricing system
would encourage development and use of solar
technology.
A two price system is not considered appropriate
because the object is to set prices that reflect
marginal costs and the variation in marginal cost isso
great that a two price system could only approximate
the marginal cost part of the time. The rest of the time,
the price would be either greater or less than
marginal cost, and much of the present inefficiency
would still persist with the addition of a more expen-
sive metering system. A related problem isthat if only
two prices are used, the change in price from one to
another must be substantial. Any sudden change in
prices could cause a shift to the other side of the high
priced period and shift the peak. Athree or more price
system is necessary sothat changes from one price to
the next can be sufficiently small. The optimal system
would have very many prices. The use of threeorfour
is a compromise between efficiency in pricing and the
costs of metering. 11
How should such a system be implemented? Inex-
pensive metering systems have been developed in
Europe and could be used, or existing meters could be
modified to provide multiple price capacity. In addition
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Duke Power'sMcGu ire Nuclear Generating Station is
about 75 percent complete
Photo courtesy Duke Power Co.
to the three time of day prices, one or two emergency
prices should be added. An emergency high rate
would substitute for excess capacity. If a large plant
broke down at a time of heavy use, the system would
switch to an emergency rate such as the one shown
as price=P e on Figure 2, graph 3. As explained
previously, the resulting difference between the
power companies' total costs and the total revenue
collected would be rebated equally to customers, so
that only the people who used more than the average
would wind up paying more. A low income, small user
could conceivably wind up receiving a payment from
the company instead of a bill attheendof the month.
What Choice. .
.
In the long run, the choice facing consumers and
Utility Commissions is between building new
generating facilities or marginal cost pricing. As
Carolina Power and Light said in an advertisement in
the Raleigh News and Observer, " . . .the less you use
at hours of peakdemand.the less generating capacity
we'll have to build. And the less your electric bill will
have to go up in the future." 12
After the decision is made to commit sums of
capital for construction of new plants, all consumers
of electricity are strapped with the economic burden.
(Duke Power's proposed Perkins Nuclear Station will
cost about three billion dollars, or the equivalent of
the net worth of Duke Power's total assets in 1 975.)
Many people seem confused by the concept behind
peak load pricing. But, these same people have lived
with peak load pricing for other commodities for most
of their lives. The telephone company has special
rates for time of day use to reward callers for using
the lines during off-peak hours. This redistributes the
demand for services. Without a marginal cost or time
of day pricing system, the telephone customers would
have no incentive to wait until evening to make calls
The telephone company would need to build more
facilities and transmission lines to accomodate the
peak hour demand, and the rates would have to in-
crease to pay for building this "needed" new capacity.
Under an average pricing system, rates would
skyrocket as the telephone company scrambled to
keep up with a new construction program. Since the
consumer would have no incentive to be selective of
the time of day he phoned long distance, the wires
would be flooded daily and the lines hopelessly tied
up, resulting eventually in "ring out" (comparable to a
brown or blackout). This would be followed by more
construction programs and more rate increases.
There is no dispute among conservative or liberal
economists that peak load or marginal cost pricing is
the most efficient way to allocate any resource, in-
cluding electricity. Marginal cost pricing is a method
of pricing followed by electric utilities in nations
around the globe. Marginal cost pricing isfollowed by
business operations throughout the United States. It
would seem such a system should be used by North
Carolina utilities.
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